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OPENING THE DOOR TO SCHOOL
CHOICE IN WISCONSIN: IS AGOSTINI V.
FELTON THE KEY?
I. INTRODUCTION
In his State of the State Address on January 28, 1997, Wiscon-
sin Governor Tommy Thompson shared a vision of educational
reform in Wisconsin that would meet the challenges of the next
millennium. This reform relied in part on the notion that parents
should be empowered with more educational choices for their
children In vowing to achieve this goal, the Governor pro-
claimed: "I will not give up the fight for the Milwaukee School
Choice program. I will take this case to the highest court in the
land. It is right and it will prevail."3 With these words Governor
Thompson pledged to battle for school choice4 in Wisconsin.
While the governor of Wisconsin seeks a successful road to a
constitutional school choice program, the United States Supreme
Court has progressively dismantled the once rigid wall of separa-
tion between church and state. In a recent decision, Agostini v.
Felton,' the Court overturned its prior decisions in Aguilar v. Fel-
L. Tommy Thompson, State of the State Address (Jan. 28, 1997), in Excerpts from Gov.
Thompson's State of the State Address, WIS. ST. J., Jan. 30,1997, at A6.
2. Id. Governor Thompson's three other principles provided that (1) "Education must
be relevant to workplace"; (2) "Schools must be held accountable for their performance";
and (3) "Technology must pervade every facet of education." Id.
3. Id.
4. "School choice" is a broad term that encompasses a variety of alternative school
plans, all of which provide a parent, to varying degrees, the opportunity to choose a school
for his or her child. See JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 206-18 (1990). A "voucher" system is one type of school choice pro-
gram which provides governmental funding "directly to students in the form of vouchers, and
students [may] use their vouchers to pay for education in the public or private school of their
own choosing." Id. at 217. Because Milwaukee's current school choice program distributes
funds payable to parents and permits a limited number of qualifying students to attend the
private school of their choice, the program is a variation on the voucher system. See WiS.
STAT. § 119.23 (1995-96) (amending Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90)). Due to the similarity
between "voucher program" and "school choice program," I will interchange the two terms
in my discussion.
5. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
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ton6 and School District v. Ball,7 as it continued to relax its re-
quirements for constitutional government assistance to public and
nonpublic secondary and elementary schools.
In the case of Milwaukee's school choice program,8 Wisconsin
has broken new ground by permitting religious and nonreligious
schools to participate in a school voucher program! Given the
opportunity for religious school participation under the current
choice program, significant constitutional issues have arisen under
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.10 In
light of the Court's present Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and the fact that its position on school choice appears more sym-
pathetic to the acceptance of school choice than that of state
courts," it may not be long before the Court upholds a school
choice program. 2 Indeed, Governor Thompson may even succeed
in bringing the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program before the
United States Supreme Court.3
6. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
7. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
8. See WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1995-96) (amending WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90).
9. See, e.g., Carol Innerst, School-Choice Pioneers Vying for Credit as Court Case Nears,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at A6, available in 1995 WL 2577137. This sentiment is further
supported by Joseph P. Viteritti, who boldly stated that:
[The Milwaukee school choice program] represents one of the most significant con-
stitutional conundrums in American jurisprudence and is poised to make its way
through the state and federal judiciaries at a time when the United States Supreme
Court appears to be undertaking a thorough reexamination of the meaning of the
First Amendment. It also signals a new chapter in legal and political discourse that
will continue to unfold as school choice programs gain increasing support among
governors, state legislators, and members of Congress.
Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Un-
der Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 113, 115 (1996).
'10. The Establishment Clause provides that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. See Viteritti, supra note 9, at 158.
12. See Joe Price, Note, Educational Reform: Making the Case for Choice, 3 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 435 (1996) (arguing that a constitutional school choice program can be imple-
mented under the Supreme Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
13. Although Wisconsin courts have recently invalidated the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program-relying primarily on state constitutional grounds, see Jackson v. Benson,
No. 97-0270, 1997 WL 476290 (Wis. Ct. App. August 22, 1997), aff'g, No. 95-CV-1982, slip
op. (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, Branch 17, January 15, 1997)-the Supreme Court would
have jurisdiction to hear this case if federal constitutional law were implicated. In Michigan
v. Long, the Court held that it may exercise jurisdiction over a state court case when:
[The] decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven
with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state
law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion .... If a state court chooses
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Paying particular attention to the Supreme Court's most recent de-
cision in Agostini, this Comment examines the federal constitutional
obstacles to the current Milwaukee Parental Choice Program ("Choice
Program"). Part II sets forth a brief procedural history of the Choice
Program as well as a discussion of the tenets of the original Choice Pro-
gram and the legislative amendments of 1995. Part III evaluates the
United States Supreme Court's First Amendment Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education and end-
ing with the Court's most recent decision in Agostini. Part IV illustrates
the Court's traditional Establishment Clause scheme and demonstrates
why the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program is constitutionally imper-
missible under that scheme. Finally, Part V provides an analysis sup-
porting the conclusion that, in light of the Court's recent allowance of
religious accommodations for religion in primary and secondary
schools, Milwaukee's Choice Program would likely be found constitu-
tionally permissible.
II. THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM
A. A Brief Procedural History
In 1989, upon the urging of Governor Thompson, the Wisconsin
Legislature enacted the nation's first parental choice program involving
the employment of private schools as an alternative to the public school
system. 4 In 1991, numerous civil rights organizations and school ad-
ministrative groups challenged the Choice Program as violating the
state constitution. 5 In reviewing the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' in-
validation of the Choice Program, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
the statute to be constitutional because it complied with the State's uni-
merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other juris-
dictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opin-
ion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do
not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.
463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). Because the Supreme Court can only consider a case involv-
ing a state school choice program where federal law is at issue, this Comment will examine
the federal constitutional obstacles to the Choice Program. For a discussion of the Wisconsin
constitutional impediments to the Choice Program, see James B. Egle, Comment, The Con-
stitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 459,499-509 (1992).
14. See Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 512 n.2, 480 N.W.2d 460, 462 n.2 (1992)
(discussing Wisconsin's tradition of progressive education).
15. Id. at 501,480 N.W.2d at 460. The challenge was brought by the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, the Association of Wisconsin School Adminis-
trators, and the Milwaukee Teachers Education Association, among others. See id-
1998]
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formity clause and public purpose doctrine. 6
Three years after the Choice Program survived its first challenge,
the Wisconsin Legislature expanded it by permitting sectarian schools
to join nonsectarian schools as an alternative to the public school sys-
tem.7 Immediately following the enactment, the Milwaukee Teachers'
Education Association and the American Civil Liberties Union joined
forces to stop the new Choice Program. 8 The challengers sought to in-
validate the Choice Program as a violation of the religion and estab-
lishment clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.1 9 In
response to the challengers' claims, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is-
sued a preliminary injunction withholding tuition payments to those re-
ligious schools expecting to enroll Choice Program students.20 In addi-
tion, the injunction continued pending the court's final ruling on the
legality of including religious schools in the Choice Program.'
In March 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard the Choice
Program case on an expedited appeal.' In deciding the issue of the
program's constitutionality, however, the court deadlocked three to
three.2' Subsequently, the case was sent back to the Dane County Cir-
cuit Court and the court's preliminary injunction continued, blocking
the flow of state tax dollars to religious schools in Milwaukee.24
On January 16, 1997, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Paul Hig-
ginbotham heard the parties' arguments and struck down the 1995
amendment to the Choice Program as violative of the Wisconsin Consti-
tution.Z In a statement made following the decision, Judge Higgin-
botham declared that, although the city of Milwaukee may need assis-
tance for its public school system, the Choice Program was
unconstitutional because "it compel[led] Wisconsin citizens of varying
religious faiths to support schools with their tax dollars that proselytize
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1995-96) (amending WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90)).
18. Steven Waiters, Governor Wants Choice Ruling, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug.
11, 1995, at B1, available in 1995 WL 2991283.
19. State ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 199 Wis. 2d 714,546 N.W.2d 140 (1996).
20. Wisconsin Court Bars Parochial Vouchers, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Aug. 26, 1995, at 9A,
available in 1995 WL 3676297.
21. Id
22. Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 714,546 N.W.2d at 140.
23. Id See also Court Deals Governor Setbacks on DP, Choice Split Keeps Religious
Schools out of Choice Plan, For Now, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 1996, at 1.
24. Thompson, 199 Wis. 2d at 720,546 N.W.2d at 142.
25. Jackson v. Benson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip op. at 13 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County,
Branch 17, Jan. 15, 1997).
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students and attempt to inculcate them with beliefs contrary to their
own.1
26
On August 22, 1997, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV,
affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that the amended
Choice Program violated the religious benefit clause of the Wisconsin
ConstitutionY More recently, on March 4, 1998, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court heard arguments addressing the Choice Program's consti-
tutionality.2
B. The Original Program
When the Wisconsin Legislature enacted the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program in 1990, it was the only government-funded voucher
program of its kind in the country.29 The Choice Program that was
26. Carol Innerst, Setback for School Choice Program Expansion Ruled Unconstitu-
tional, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 16,1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 3661143.
27. Jackson v. Benson, No. 97-0270, 1997 WL 476290, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 22,
1997). See also Matt Pommer, Appeals Court Nixes Religious School Choice, CAP. TIMES,
Aug. 22,1997, at 1A, available in 1997 WL 12258872.
28. Carol Innerst, Court Battles over School Choice Loom in Wisconsin and Vermont,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4,1998, at A4, available in 1998 WL 3441431.
In addition to court action within the state, members of the state senate have introduced
a bill that would amend Section 119.23(2)(a) by eliminating sectarian school participation in
the Choice Program, but leaving the remaining amendments unchanged. Wis. S.B. 28 (1997-
98 Sess.). Additionally, state representative Polly Williams, (D-Milwaukee), introduced a
bill that would not only eliminate participation of sectarian private schools, but would reduce
the percentage of Milwaukee Public School students who could enroll in the Choice Program.
Wis. A.B. 183 (1997-98 Sess.).
29. Although Milwaukee's Choice Program was the first of its kind, other states, such as
Vermont and Ohio, have adopted voucher programs of their own. In 1991, the Vermont
legislature passed an amendment that authorized state public schools to allow for school
choice by requiring local school districts without high schools to pay tuition for students to
attend either an approved private school or a public high school of choice in another district
up to an amount equal to the state average of per pupil spending. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 822 (1991). In 1994, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that tuition reimbursement for a
child to attend a sectarian school of choice outside the state did not violate either the state or
the Federal Constitution. Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 641 A.2d 352 (Vt. 1994).
In August 1996, a local school board sued the Vermont Department of Education when the
Department refused to reimburse the board for tuition paid at a local Catholic high school.
See Mark Walsh, Vermont District Provides Latest Test in Battle over Religious Vouchers,
EDUC. WEEK, Sept. 18, 1996, at 16. At the present time, the case is before the state supreme
court. See School Choice Showdowns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1998, at A22, available in 1998
WL-WSJ 3485616.
In 1995, Ohio enacted a voucher program very similar to Milwaukee's program. The
Pilot Project Scholarship Program ("Pilot Program") provides "for a number of students re-
siding in such district to receive scholarships to attend alternative schools, and for an equal
number of students to receive tutorial assistance grants while attending public school in such
district." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975, (A) (Banks-Baldwin 1995). The $5.5 million
1998]
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originally enacted allowed as many as 1,000 students from low-income
families in Milwaukee to receive tuition vouchers of $2,500 for use at
nonsectarian private schools.0° To participate in the Choice Program, a
student's family income could not exceed 1.75 times the federal poverty
level.31 Furthermore, no more than 49% of a private school's total en-
rollment could consist of pupils attending under the Choice Program.32
That percentage was increased to 65% in 1993. 33 If a participating
school received applications from more eligible students than it was
permitted to accept, the school was required to randomly select stu-
dents for the program.'
Under the original Choice Program, the Superintendent of Public
Instruction made payments directly to participating private schools, and
the amount was equal to the per-pupil student aid provided to the Mil-
waukee public schools.35 Moreover, the funds disbursed under the
36Choice Program were appropriated from general purpose revenues,
Pilot Program awards 1,500 students in Cleveland up to $2,500 each toward tuition at one of
53 participating schools charging no more than 10% above the amount. See Christopher
Davey, Voucher Plan Faces Suit Group Alleges Church-State Violation, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Jan. 11, 1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 2226286. Currently, the fate of the
Pilot Program lies with the state supreme court, which will review the state court of appeals'
decision that the program violates the State and Federal Constitution. See Catherine Can-
disky, Voucher Money Being Wasted, Audit Reveals, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1998, at
2B, available in 1998 WL 5693331; see also Margaret A. Nero, Comment, The Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program: Why Voucher Programs Do No Violate the Establishment
Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103 (1997) (arguing that the Ohio court of appeals erred in ruling
that the Pilot Program violated federal constitutional precepts).
In addition to Wisconsin's, Ohio's, and Vermont's publicly funded voucher programs,
several privately funded school choice programs currently exist, including programs in Mil-
waukee-the Partners Advancing Values in Education (PAVE); New York-the Stu-
dent/Sponsor Program (SSP); Indianapolis-Golden Rule; and in San Antonio-Children's
Educational Opportunity (CEO). See Paul E. Peterson, Vouching for a Religious Education,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1995, at A6, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 9913315.
30. WIs. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90). Because the Milwaukee public school system has an
enrollment of approximately 100,000, the number of students who could participate in the
program is capped at 1,000 by Section 119.23(2)(b)(1), which allows a maximum of 1% of the
school district's students to participate. For the 1994-95 school year, that percentage was
raised to 1.5%-approximately 1,460 students. See WIs. STAT. § 119.23(2)(b)(1) (1993-94).
31. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1) (1993-94).
32. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(b)(2) (1989-90).
33. 1993 Wis. ACT 16, § 2300.
34. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(3).
35. WIs. STAT. § 119.23(4) (1993-94); $2,500 received by a private school therefore rep-
resented the amount that the Milwaukee School District received per student in state fund-
ing.
36. Id. §§ 20.005(3), 119.23(4).
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which consist primarily of general taxes collected by the state. 7
Prior to the 1995 amendments, the Choice Program faced two con-
stitutional challenges. The first, in Davis v. Grover,38 alleged that the
Choice Program violated Wisconsin's constitutional requirement of
"uniformity" in the school system,39 as well as the state's public purpose
doctrine.4° In upholding the Choice Program, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court determined that the limited scope and experimental nature of the
Choice Program precluded it from violating either the uniformity clause
or the public purpose doctrine.4
The second challenge, in Miller v. Benson,42 contended that the
Choice Program's exclusion of religious schools denied the plaintiffs
"equal access to an available government benefit based upon their re-
ligious beliefs," and, therefore, violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion and their Fourteenth Amendment right
to equal protection.43 In rejecting the plaintiffs' demand that the Choice
Program encompass religious private schools as well as nonreligious
ones, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that
the direct method of payment to the participating schools would violate
of the Establishment Clause.'
37. Id. § 20.001.
38. 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).
39. Article 10, section 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution requires that "[t]he legislature
shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform
as practicable."
40. Although the public purpose doctrine is not constitutionally prescribed, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court has consistently applied the doctrine to determine whether public expen-
ditures are used for a public purpose. See Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501,540, 480 N.W.2d
460,474 (1992).
41. The court held that, "[s]ufficient safeguards are included in the program to ensure
that participating private schools are under adequate governmental supervision reasonably
necessary under the circumstances to attain the public purpose of improving educational
quality." Id. at 513, 480 N.W.2d at 463. See also Egle, supra note 13, at 501-09 (discussing
the state's uniformity clause in Davis v. Grover).
42. 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Wis. 1995), vacated, 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 1212.
44. The court reasoned that permitting religious private schools to participate in the
Choice Program would closely resemble the reimbursement program stricken in Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See Miller, 878 F.
Supp. at 1215-16. The Miller court ruled: "The present state of First Amendment law com-
pels this court to hold that the plaintiffs' request to expand the current Choice Program to
make tuition reimbursements directly payable to religious private schools who admit eligible
Choice Program school children would violate the Establishment Clause." Id at 1216.
1998]
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C. The Amended Program
In July of 1995, the Wisconsin Legislature amended the Choice Pro-
gram to permit qualifying religious private schools to participate." The
revised statute provided that "any pupil in grades kindergarten to 12
who resides within the city [of Milwaukee] may attend, at no charge,
any private school located in the city. '
In addition to eliminating the restriction against religious
schools, the legislature changed the method by which the funds
would be disbursed to the participating private schools. Instead of
paying the private schools directly, a check would be payable to
the parent of the student. 7 The check, however, would be sent to
the private school, and, in order to redeem the funds, the parent
would be required to "restrictively endorse the check for the use
of the private school."'
Under the Choice Program provisions, the funds payable to
the parent were determined to be:
[A]n amount equal to the total amount to which the school dis-
trict is entitled under § 121.08 divided by the school district
membership [i.e., the per-pupil state aid], or an amount equal to
the private school's operating and debt service cost per pupil
that is related to educational programming, as determined by the
department, whichever is less. 9
For the 1995-96 school year, the per-pupil state aid provided to
the Milwaukee Public Schools was approximately $3,667, and for
the 1996-97 school year, the amount was $4,400.' The tuition
charged by most of the participating private schools in the Choice
Program, however, was less than either of these figures." Because
of this fact, the participating private schools would obtain more
funds from the state for each Choice Program student than the
schools would receive for each non-Choice Program student who
pays tuition. 2
Under the amended Choice Program, the legislature also included a
45. See 1995-96 Budget Act, 1995 WIs. AcT 27 § 4002.
46. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a) (1995-96).
47. Id- § 119.23(4).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Jackson v. Benson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip op. at 13 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County,
Branch 17, Jan. 15, 1997).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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provision that allowed Choice Program students to opt out of any
"religious activity" for which the student's parent has submitted a writ-
ten request for such an exemption.' Finally, the new Choice Program
increased the number of students who would be permitted to participate
in the program from the original 1% of the city's school district student
population to 7% during the 1995-96 school year and 15% during the
1996-97 school year.' The amended version also lifted the restriction
on the percentage of Choice Program students who could enroll in a
private school.5
Since the adoption of the amended Choice Program, 122 private
schools participated during the 1995-96 school year. 6 Of the 122 private
schools, 89 were sectarian and 33 were non-sectarian.' In addition,
nearly 84% of students who attended private schools in Milwaukee
during the 1994-95 school year attended religiously-affiliated schools. 8
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Everson v. Board of Education: Endorsing Neutrality
Since the 1940s, the nation's highest court has struggled to balance
individual rights regarding the free exercise of religion with the prohibi-
tion against any state establishment of religion in the context of relig-
ious schools. 9 In the seminal case, Everson v. Board of Education,' the
United States Supreme Court endorsed Thomas Jefferson's call for "a
53. The exemption provision states: "A private school may not require a pupil attend-
ing the private school under this section to participate in any religious activity if the pupil's
parent or guardian submits to the pupil's teacher or the private school's principal a written
request that the pupil be exempt from such activities." WIs. STAT. § 119.23(7)(c) (1995-96).
54. Id § 119.23(2)(b).
55. Under the original Choice Program, only 49% of a participating private school's en-
rollment could consist of Choice Program students. Id. § 119.23(2)(B)(2) (1989-90). In 1993,
the percentage was enlarged to 65%. 1993 WIs. ACT 16, § 2300.
56. Jackson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip op. at 10.
57. Jackson v. Benson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip. op. at 10 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County,
Branch 17, Jan. 15, 1997).
58. Id. According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, 79% of the nation's
private schools are religious (of which 32% are Catholic) and 85% of the students attending
private schools attend religious schools (of which 60% are Catholic (Catholic religious stu-
dents account for 50% of the nation's private school students)). See U.S. NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Digest of Edu-
cation Statistics (1995), reprinted in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996,
THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK (116th ed. 1996).
59. The Supreme Court's first decision involving financial assistance to religious institu-
tions was Gradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
60. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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wall of separation between church and state," as well as the principle
that a state may pass no laws that "aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another."61 The Court nevertheless carved out
an exception for certain state aid to religious primary and secondary
educational institutions.'2
At issue in Everson was a New Jersey statute that allowed school
districts to make rules providing for the transportation of children to
and from public and nonpublic schools. 3 Pursuant to state law, a local
school board authorized reimbursement for money spent by parents of
children who were being transported on school buses."4 Because the
parents of Roman Catholic school students were reimbursed for their
children's bus expenses, the law was challenged on grounds that it vio-
lated the Establishment Clause.65
In upholding the aid program, the Supreme Court determined that
the program was neutral because it paid the bus fares of parochial stu-
dents as a part of a "general program" under which student expenses
for public and private schools were reimbursed.66 The state, therefore,
61. Id at 15-16.
62. Since Everson, the Supreme Court has upheld aid to religious primary and secon-
dary schools in the following cases: Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (holding that a state university may not refuse to pay printing costs of
a student publication otherwise eligible to receive printing costs because the publication has
a Christian perspective, when the payments are made directly to the printer pursuant to a
religiously neutral program); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(ruling that school districts must provide, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act, a sign-language interpreter to accompany a deaf child to classes at a Catholic high
school); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (holding that a state may allow tax deductions
for tuition, textbooks, and transportation expenses for parents of all schoolchildren, including
children attending religious schools); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding a state program that permitted reimbursement of
private schools for the expenses of compiling state required data, such as student attendance
records, or administering and grading standardized state educational achievement tests);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (ruling that a state may provide religious school stu-
dents with books, standardized testing and scoring, hearing and speech diagnostic testing);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (holding that state aid may be used for construction
grants to religious colleges to construct facilities used for secular purposes). In the context of
post-secondary schools, aid has been upheld in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 673 (1971)
(holding that the federal government may provide construction grants to religious-related
colleges and universities to construct facilities used for nonreligious purposes); Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (holding that a state program providing state-
approved textbooks to all students was permissible). Most of these cases will be considered
in this discussion.
63. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 5.
66. 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
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was "neutral in it relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers."' 7 Thus, by allowing aid to pass to religious institutions, the
Supreme Court recognized an underlying principle for Establishment
Clause jurisprudence: the government action must be neutral toward
religious and nonreligious groups.'
B. Formulation of the Lemon Test
In the two decades that followed the Everson decision, the Supreme
Court was virtually silent on matters involving aid to sectarian schools.
In 1968, however, the Court heard the case of Board of Education v.
Allen, which involved a New York law requiring public school boards to
purchase textbooks and lend them without charge to public and private
schools.69 In acknowledging the Everson precedent, the Court adopted
the principle of neutrality, but it also supplemented its analysis with an
earlier test from the case of School District v. Schempp.0 In ascertain-
ing what aid to religious schools was permissible and what aid was pro-
scribed, the Court considered the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment." Applying this two-part test, the Court determined that the
New York statute had the secular purpose of attempting to advance
educational opportunities for students. 2 The primary effect, moreover,
was permissible because the benefit to religion was as insubstantial as
the benefit provided in Everson 3
Three years after the Allen decision, the Court in Lemon v. Kurtz-
mane4 considered the appropriation of state funds for reimbursing ex-
penses and supplementing salaries of teachers in nonpublic schools.7" In
Lemon, two statutes were at issue. The first was a Pennsylvania law
authorizing the reimbursement of expenditures for teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials used exclusively for secular sub-
jects; the second was a Rhode Island law providing a 15% salary in-
crease to teachers of secular subjects in non-public elementary schools.76
67. Id at 18.
68. See id. at 18.
69. 392 U.S. 236,239 (1968).
70. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that required Bible readings and recitation of the
Lord's prayer at public schools violated the Establishment Clause).
71. Id at 222.
72. 392 U.S. at 243.
73. See id. at 243-44.
74. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
75. See iL at 607-10.
76. See iL at 607-11.
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Of the students attending non-public schools in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island, over 95% attended religious schools, most of which were
affiliated with the Roman Catholic church."
Expounding upon the two-part test in Allen, the Lemon Court con-
sidered an additional factor: the extent of entanglement between gov-
ernment and religious institutions.' By adding a third element to its
analysis, the Court created what later became known as the Lemon test.
This test has subsequently been considered the standard for an Estab-
lishment Clause analysis.79 In essence, the Lemon test consists of three
prongs: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; sec-
ond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.""
In applying this test, the Court first found each state's legislative his-
tory to evince a secular purpose of improving the quality of secular edu-
cation in public and non-public schools.8 After analyzing the first
prong, however, the Court jumped to the third prong and determined
that the program invalidated the Pennsylvania and the Rhode Island
statutes on grounds of impermissible entanglement of church and
state.8' The Court held that entanglement was prevalent because the
program presented potential for political division along religious lines
between the supporters and the opponents of the aid program.' Thus,
in relying on the third prong to nullify the state action, the Lemon
Court ultimately required only one of the three factors to fail in order
to invalidate a governmental program.
77. Id. at 608, 610.
78. Id. at 613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (holding that an ex-
emption from property taxation for real or personal property used exclusively for religious,
education, or charitable purposes did not violate the Establishment Clause)).
79. Supreme Court cases that have relied on the three-part Lemon test include: Bowen
v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
80. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
81. Id. at 613. The first prong of Lemon has rarely invalidated a state action; however,
one notable exception is Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
82. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
83. Id. at 622.
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C. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist:
An Analogue for the Choice Program
In 1973, the Court decided Committee for Public Education and Re-
ligious Liberty v. Nyquist, a case involving a tuition reimbursement pro-
gram remarkably similar to the Milwaukee Choice Program.8 Nyquist
involved a New York statute that provided public aid exclusively for
non-public schools.' The first of the statute's three aid programs pro-
vided for direct grants to private schools for the purpose of maintaining
and repairing equipment and facilities "to ensure the students' health,
welfare and safety."" The annual grant provided $30 to $40 per student,
not to exceed 50% of the average per-student cost for equivalent serv-
ices in the public schoolsY. The second of the programs authorized tui-
tion reimbursements of $50 to $100, not to exceed 50% of tuition paid,
for low-income parents of children attending private elementary or sec-
ondary schools." The final program provided tax relief to those parents
who failed to qualify for tuition grants.89
Examining the first program, which provided for the maintenance
and repair of non-public schools, the Court noted that the funds were
paid directly to the schools, almost all of which were affiliated with the
Roman Catholic Church.'o The money was also distributed without re-
striction on usage, so long as the expenses did not exceed 50% of com-
parable expenditures in the public school system.9' Based on these
facts, the Court concluded that, without any restriction on the use of the
funds, "it simply cannot be denied that this section has a primary effect
that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities
of sectarian elementary and secondary schools." The Court further
noted that had the funds offered "an indirect and incidental effect bene-
ficial to religious institutions," such aid would have been deemed per-
missible. 3
Upon consideration of the second program, which provided tuition
84. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
85. Id at 761-62.
86. Id. at 762.
87. IM at 763.
88. Id. at 764.
89. Id at 765.
90. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774
(1973).
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id at 775.
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reimbursement for low-income parents, the Court held that this provi-
sion also failed the primary effects prong.94 The Court initially observed
that tuition grants clearly could not be given directly to religious schools
because the State could not guarantee that the financial assistance
would be "used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological pur-
poses."95 Although New York's program, in fact, disbursed funds to
parents instead of to private schools, the Court, nonetheless, deter-
mined that the method of payment, whether as a reimbursement, sub-
sidy, or reward, was only one of many factors to be addressed.96
Rather than focusing solely on the method of disbursement, the
Court considered the overall effect of the program.' The Court held
that because the tuition grants are "offered as an incentive to parents to
send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash
payments to them, the Establishment Clause is violated whether or not
the actual dollars given eventually find their way into the sectarian insti-
tutions."" Furthermore, the Court noted that it was of no significance
that the State allotted the funds as a reimbursement which, the State ar-
gued, meant that the parent was "absolutely free to spend the money he
receives in any manner he wishes."99
In examining the third program, the Court rejected the provision
granting income tax benefits to parents of private school children.'0' In
comparing the tax deduction with the tuition grant in the second pro-
gram, the Court noted, "[t]he only difference is that one parent receives
an actual cash payment while the other is allowed to reduce by an arbi-
trary amount the sum he would otherwise be obliged to pay over to the
State."'0 ' Thus, the Court concluded, "[t]he qualifying parent under ei-
ther program receives the same form of encouragement and reward for
sending his children to nonpublic schools."'"
In short, the Nyquist Court condemned all funds distributed to sec-
tarian schools that could be used without restriction. Additionally, the
Court proscribed all tuition grants and tax deductions for parents in
which the state program provided an "incentive" for parents to enroll
94. See id. at 780.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 774.
97. See id. at 785-76.
98. Id. at 786.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 791.
101. Idt
102. Id.
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their children in a private religious school.' O
In 1975, two years after Nyquist, the Court in Meek v. Pittenge°4
considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that author-
ized the state to lend textbooks, equipment, instructional materials, and
auxiliary services without charge to both public and nonpublic
schools.0 5 Finding the textbook loan program to be identical to that in
Board of Education v. Allen, the Court upheld the validity of the text-
book loan provisions."" The Court, however, rejected the provisions
authorizing instructional material and equipment-as well as auxiliary
aid-because such assistance primarily benefited non-public schools,
the majority of which were sectarian in nature.'O° In utilizing the Lemon
test, the Court ultimately held that all but the textbook provisions had
the primary effect of advancing religion."°
In the wake of Lemon, Nyquist, and Meek, the Supreme Court per-
mitted only the slightest exceptions to the general rule that state aid
could not permissibly flow to elementary and secondary parochial
schools. In addition, after Nyquist the Court seemingly eliminated any
chance of a state-funded voucher program. With the subsequent
changes in the make-up of the Court, however, the possibility of a con-
stitutional school voucher program has remained."
D. Departures from Lemon
Given the breadth of constitutional analysis in the Lemon decision,
the three-pronged inquiry offered an appealing structure for an Estab-
lishment Clause analysis. The Lemon test, however, also had its limita-
tions."1 Although most of the cases decided within a decade after
Lemon applied the Court's three-part analysis,"' a few decisions ven-
tured beyond this analysis. The 1973 case of Hunt v. McNair12 is but
one example.
103. In Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), a companion case to Nyquist, the Court,
for similar reasons in Nyquist, struck down a Pennsylvania tuition reimbursement program
that provided funds to parents of nonpublic school students.
104. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
105. Id. at 351-55.
106. Id. at 360-62.
107. Id. at 364-371.
108. Id. at 364-73.
109. In 1981, Sandra Day O'Connor was appointed as Justice, followed by Antonin
Scalia in 1986 and Anthony Kennedy in 1988.
110. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 605 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See cases cited supra note 79.
112. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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At issue in Hunt was a South Carolina statute that authorized con-
struction grants to religiously-affiliated colleges in order to construct fa-
cilities for nonreligious purposes."' With respect to the second prong of
the Lemon test, the Court noted that aid will ordinarily "have a primary
effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which re-
ligion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are [sic]
subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically relig-
ious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.""' Relying on
these two considerations-pervasiveness of religion and funding of re-
ligious activity in a secular setting-the Court held that the state pro-
gram in Hunt did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.15 In
looking at the religious functions and activities of a grant-receiving
school, the court applied a more exacting analysis by examining the ac-
tual nature of the religious institutions involved."6 The Court's devia-
tion from the Lemon test compelled it to state that the Lemon test pro-
vided "no more than [a] helpful signpost [in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence].""'
Ten years later in 1983, the Court in Mueller v. Allen. upheld a
Minnesota law enabling taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax
expenditures incurred in sending their children to primary and secon-
dary schools. Under the program, parents could deduct expenses neces-
sary for their child's tuition, transportation, and textbooks at a public or
a nonpublic school."9
In considering the primary effects prong of the Lemon test, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, sought to distinguish Mueller from
Nyquist."20 In Nyquist, public assistance in the form of tuition grants and
tax deductions was provided only to parents of children in non-public
schools. 2' The Minnesota law, however, permitted all parents-
whether their children attended a public or non-public school-to de-
duct a portion of their children's educational costs.'" The Court, there-
fore, determined that a program that "neutrally provide[d] state assis-
113. See id. at 734.
114. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
115. See id
116. See id
117. Id. at 741.
118. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
119. See id at 391.
120. Id at 395-98.
121. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756.
122. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390-91.
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tance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge
under the Establishment Clause." 123
In addition to examining the type of aid provided, the Court consid-
ered Minnesota's method of distributing financial assistance. 24  Ac-
cording to the Court, under the state's plan, public funds became avail-
able through the choice of individual parents." The Court admitted,
however, that aid to parents "ultimately ha[d] an economic effect com-
parable to that of aid given directly to the schools attended by their
children., 12 6 Nonetheless, because the parents were making "numerous,
private choices," the Court maintained that the State was not stamping
its approval on religion." The Court, in addition, acknowledged the
fact that the Nyquist Court held state aid to be unconstitutional, but
found that Nyquist was distinguishable on other grounds." Despite
Mueller's similarity to Nyquist, the Court chose not to question the
Nyquist decision, ultimately concluding that Minnesota's deductions did
not have the primary effect of advancing religion.'29
It should be noted that in ascertaining the primary effect under
Lemon, the Mueller Court refused to engage in a statistical or empirical
analysis of the recipients of the tax benefits.' Under the state statute in
Mueller, the expenditures for public school transportation, textbooks,
and tuition were shown to be of only negligible value.' Therefore, the
petitioners argued, the vast majority of the tax deductions went to par-
ents of nonpublic school children.32 Furthermore, the facts demon-
strated that 96% of the children attending nonpublic schools attended
religiously-affiliated institutions.13 ' Thus, the petitioners contended that
an empirical analysis would have shown that, despite the statute's inten-
tion to include "all parents," the vast majority of the tax benefits were
realized by parents of parochial school children.34 These arguments,
however, were ignored by the Court.
123. Id at 398-99.
124. l& at 399.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 402.
130. See id.
131. Id
132. See id. at 401.
133. Id
134. Id.
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Although the Mueller Court found grounds on which to distinguish
the Minnesota tax deduction plan from the tuition and tax deduction
programs in Nyquist, the Court, apparently abandoned one of the tenets
upon which Nyquist stood.135 In Nyquist, the Court proscribed all tuition
grants and tax deductions for parents in which the program provided an
"incentive" for parents to enroll their children in a private religious
school.'36 The Mueller Court, however, disregarded this factor. Placing
form over substance, the Court ignored the petitioner's evidence show-
ing that the Minnesota tax plan did in fact provide a significant incen-
tive for parents to send their children to private schools.
In the aftermath of Mueller, the Court appeared more willing to re-
gard the Lemon test as a mere formality rather than as an effective tool
in assessing the constitutionality of state aid to schools.' 37 As the Muel-
ler decision demonstrated, other factors became necessary to the
Court's Establishment Clause analysis. One such factor was a facial de-
termination of the neutrality or general scope of the state action. The
second factor considered by the Court was the extent to which the par-
ents receiving the aid were in fact making private and independent
choices.
Following the Mueller decision, the Court in Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Services for the Blind' upheld the payment of vocational edu-
cational assistance funds to a blind student attending a Bible college.
Under the funding program, financial assistance was available to stu-
dents attending both public and private schools.1'3 The Court deter-
mined that the funding provided "no financial incentive for students to
undertake sectarian education" and did not give greater benefits for re-
cipients who attended religious schools.'O Interestingly, by considering
whether the state program created a financial incentive to attend a re-
ligious school, the majority opinion, written by Justice Marshall, revived
the "incentive" factor which the Mueller court had previously aban-
doned.
In addition to its reliance on Nyquist, the Court also applied one of
135. According to one commentator, if one compared the Mueller decision with
Nyquist, one would find "the distinctions asserted are nothing more than pretextual argu-
ments indicating an effective reversal of Nyquist." Price, supra note 12, at 475.
136. See supra Part III.C.
137. The Mueller Court adhered to the sentiment expressed in Hunt that Lemon pro-
vided "no more than [a] helpful signpost." See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394.
138. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
139. See id. at 483.
140. Id at 488.
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the factors considered in Mueller.4' The Court noted that the aid flow-
ing to religious institutions did so only as a consequence of the
"genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients."' 42
Ultimately, the Witters Court found no evidence suggesting that the
aid would be used to promote religious education. 43 Thus, in conclud-
ing that the primary effect was to aid disabled students, and not to pro-
vide a religious education, the program was upheld under the Estab-
lishment Clause.'"
E. Post-Lemon Era
A decade after the Mueller decision, the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District45 addressed the issue of whether the use of
government-funded sign-language interpreters in religious schools vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. 46 In a decision that all but ignored the
three-pronged Lemon test,47 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, relied upon precedent established in Mueller and Witters.
First, the Court reiterated the principle that aid programs that
"neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without
reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause
challenge."'"4 Because the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
did not distinguish between public schools and private sectarian and
nonsectarian institutions, the Court concluded that the statute was neu-
tral.149 Second, the Court determined that the aid offered "no financial
incentive" for parents to send their children to religious institutions.5
Finally, in validating the state aid at issue, the Court reaffirmed the
tenet that government financial assistance that "ultimately flows to" re-
ligious schools as a result of "genuinely independent and private
choices" of the recipients is permissible under the Establishment
141. Id
142. Id at 487.
143. Id. at 488.
144. Id. at 488-89.
145. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
146. Id. at 9.
147. Cf. Lisa S. Pierce, Note, Making Aid Without Lemon?: Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills School District, 63 U. IN. L. REV. 565, 599-600, 605 (1994) (arguing that although the
majority in Zobrest did not expressly rely on the Lemon test, its "basic guidelines" were util-
ized by the Court).
148. Id at 8-9.
149. Id at 10.
150. Ld at 9-10.
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Clause. 5'
In 1995, the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia2 considered a state university funding pro-
gram that authorized payments to outside contractors for the printing
costs of publications of student groups.53 Following the University's
denial of funds to a Christian student journal, the student group, Wide
Awake Productions, challenged the action on the grounds that it vio-
lated the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amend-
ment.' In overturning the University's action, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
considered two central tenets under the Establishment Clause: (1)
whether the government action was neutral, and (2) whether the bene-
fits to religion were incidental and insubstantial.'55
Under the first tenet, the Court determined that the University pro-
gram was neutral because the purpose of the funding scheme was to
support the diversity and creativity of the students.'56 According to the
Court, "the neutrality of the program distinguishes the student fees
from a tax levied for the direct support of a church."'," While a general
tax that provided direct funds to a church would be unconstitutional,
the student fee assessment in Rosenberger was used specifically for stu-
dent programs, and the funds, in the case of the Christian journal, went
directly to the printer.'58 This use of student fees, the Court concluded,
was "a far cry from a general public assessment designed and effected to
provide financial support for a church."'59 Finally, in considering the
second tenet, the Court determined the benefits of religion to be inci-
dental and insubstantial because the central use of the funds was for
secular activities, such as printing."W
In the wake of the Court's pronouncements in Zobrest and Rosen-
berger, the Court, without explicitly abandoning Lemon, apparently
made a clear departure from the once-obligatory Lemon test. In the
place of the three-pronged analysis is something of an ad hoc approach
in which the Court weighs several factors of its choosing. Although
151. 1& at 9.
152. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
153. Id. at 822.
154. Id. at 822-23.
155. I& at 839, 843-44.
156. Id at 840.
157. Id.
158. Id at 841.
159. Ia
160. Id at 843-44.
[Vol. 81:843
SCHOOL CHOICE IN WISCONSIN
these factors have not been applied consistently, three of these consid-
erations stand out. First, the Court will consider whether the statute, on
its face, provides neutral benefits to a broad class of citizens. Second,
the Court will determine who the recipients of the aid are, whether such
aid directly or indirectly benefits a religious group, and the extent to
which any benefit obtained resulted from a purely individual and per-
sonal choices. Third, the Court will examine the statute to determine
whether any provision offers an individual a financial incentive to at-
tend, enroll, or otherwise participate in a religious organization.
F. Agostini v. Felton
In Agostini v. Felton, the most recent decision involving government
aid to non-public schools, the Court addressed New York City's Title I
program, which offered financial assistance to disadvantaged children."'
At issue in Agostini was the constitutionality of a permanent injunction
ordered by the District Court for the Eastern District of New York fol-
lowing the Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton.1'2 Aguilar held uncon-
stitutional New York's use of federal funds under Title I of the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to compensate public
teachers who taught children from low-income families in parochial
schools.'6 The Agostini Court, in a five to four majority opinion, de-
termined that Aguilar and its companion case, School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball,16 ' were no longer good law because the assumptions
upon which they were based had been rejected by the Court's recent
First Amendment jurisprudence.'
Under the Title I program, Congress sought to "provid[e] full edu-
cational opportunity to every child regardless of economic back-
ground., 166 The program functioned through "local educational agen-
cies," or LEA's, which worked to improve public and non-public
students' performance standards as well as to provide "'counseling,
mentoring, and other pupil services.""' 67 Additionally, the services were
required to be provided by public employees and only for those stu-
161. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
162. Id at 2003.
163. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct.
1997 (1997).
164. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
165. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
166. Id at 2003 (citation omitted).
167. Id (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 6315(c)(1)(A), (E)).
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dents eligible for aid." Furthermore, the Title I services themselves
had to be "'secular, neutral, and nonideological,"' and "must
'supplement, and in no case supplant, the level of services' already pro-
vided by the private school."'169 Similar to the program in Aguilar, the
"Shared Time" program in Ball provided remedial and "enrichment
classes" and were held at non-public schools for eligible students.70
The Court's analysis in Aguilar and Ball utilized upon the Lemon
test. In Aguilar, the Court found the program "necessitated an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion because public employees
who teach on the premises of religious schools must be closely moni-
tored to ensure that they do not inculcate religion.,
171
In Ball, the Court determined that the Shared Time program cre-
ated the impermissible effect of advancing religion.172 According to the
Agostini Court, the effects prong in Ball relied upon three assumptions:
(i) any public employee who works on the premises of a religious
school is presumed to inculcate religion in her work; (ii) the
presence of public employees on private school premises creates
a symbolic union between church and state; (iii) any and all pub-
lic aid that directly aids the education function of religious
schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even if
the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private deci-
sionmaking.'73
After dismissing the first two premises, the Court rejected the third,
stating that government aid that provided direct assistance to the educa-
tional function of a sectarian school is not necessarily impermissible. 4
The Court's evaluation of the significance of direct government aid
to religious schools relied on Witters and Nyquist, in which tuition
grants were "'made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution bene-
fited.""' 75 The funds were provided directly to eligible students, who
then used the proceeds to pay for tuition at the school of their choice.
17 1
168. Id. at 2004.
169. Id (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 6321(a)(2) and 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(a) (1996)).
170. Id. at 2008.
171. lId at 2010.
172. 1i
173. Id
174. Id at 2011.
175. lI (quoting Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487
(1986) (quoting Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-
83, n.38 (1973))).
176. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997).
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According to the Court,
[T]his transaction was no different from a State's issuing a pay-
check to one of its employees, knowing that the employee would
donate part or all of the check to a religious institution. In both
situations, any money that ultimately went to religious institu-
tions did so "only as a result of the genuinely independent and
private choices of individuals.""
In addition, the Court found the Title I program to be indistinguish-
able from Zobrest, which provided sign-language interpreters to stu-
dents under the IDEA.78 Under both programs, the Court determined
that aid was only available for students who met certain requirements,
but that it could be used at any school which the student attended 9
Additionally, the Court found the services under both programs to be
supplemental and, thus, did not "'reliev[e] sectarian schools of costs
they otherwise would have borne in educating their students.""'"
Moreover, the Court held that (1) Title I funds distributed to LEA's
and then to the students were not direct grants to participating
schools,"8' (2) the number of sectarian school students who receive
"otherwise neutral aid" was not determinative,'2 and (3) Title I funds
did not create a financial incentive because "the aid is allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion,
and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a
nondiscriminatory basis."'"
Ultimately, Agostini stands for several propositions. First, govern-
ment aid that provides direct assistance to the educational function of a
sectarian school is permissible. Second, aid that merely supplements a
school is acceptable as long as it does not relieve the school of costs it
otherwise would have borne in educating its students. Third, funds that
are not distributed directly to participating schools are more likely to be
177. Id. at 2011-12 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
17& Il at 2012.
179. Id. at 2012-13.
180. Id. at 2013 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,12 (1996)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2014. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued that "nothing since
Ball and Aguilar and before this case has eroded the distinction between 'direct and substan-
tial' and 'indirect and incidental' [government aid]." Id. at 2025. The majority's result,
Souter concluded, "is to repudiate the very reasonable line drawn in Aguilar and Ball, and to
authorize direct state aid to religious institutions on an unparalleled scale, in violation of the
Establishment Clause's central prohibition against religious subsidies by the government."
Id. at 2019.
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constitutionally valid. Fourth, the percentage of sectarian students who
receive aid is not determinative of the program's constitutionality. Fi-
nally, an assistance program will not create a financial incentive when
the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria and is equally
available to both religious and secular beneficiaries.
IV. THE CHOICE PROGRAM UNDER THE TRADITIONAL LEMON TEST
Although the Supreme Court is currently applying new standards
under the Establishment Clause, it will be helpful first to undertake a
Lemon analysis of the Choice Program. Under the traditional three-
pronged Lemon test, the first requirement is that the government action
have a secular legislative purpose. Like most state actions considered
under the purpose prong, the Choice Program clearly has such a legiti-
mate secular purpose. According to the program's history, "'School
Choice' emerged in the 1980s as a policy option which ... would in-
crease educational opportunity and improve learning."'' More specifi-
cally, the goals of the Choice Program were threefold:
(1) [O]ut of fairness, low-income families should have at least
some of the choices available to families with greater income; (2)
students from low-income families would have a greater chance
of succeeding in non-public schools; and (3) choice would
strengthen public schools by causing them to focus on satisfying
parents and students."5
In considering the 1995 amendments to the Choice Program, the ex-
panded Choice Program was intended to provide a greater array of edu-
cational options as well as increase the number of students who can par-
ticipate in the program."6 Lemon's first prong, therefore, is clearly
satisfied.
Under the second prong, the principal or primary effect of the gov-
ernment action must neither be to advance nor be to inhibit religion.
Although the Court refused to engage in an empirical analysis in ascer-
taining the primary effect in Mueller v. Allen,' such an inquiry may
nonetheless be revealing. Using an empirical evaluation, this Comment
will consider where the majority of students and funds end up in order
184. HOWARD L. FULLER & SAMMIS B. WHITE, WISCONSIN POLICY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, EXPANDED SCHOOL CHOICE IN MILWAUKEE: A PROFILE OF ELIGIBLE
STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS 3 (1995).
185. ld. at 4.
186. See Jackson v. Benson, No. 95-CV-1982 slip op. at 6-8 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County,
Branch 17, January 15, 1997).
187. See supra Part III.D.
[Vol. 81:843
SCHOOL CHOICE IN WISCONSIN
to pinpoint the primary effect.
Under the Choice Program, of the 122 eligible private schools, only
27% are nonsectarian."' It has been estimated that of the 22,000 stu-
dents enrolled in the participating private schools, over 20,000 were en-
rolled in private religious schools.8 9 Furthermore, the Milwaukee
School District estimated that as many as 7,000 students could have par-
ticipated in the 1995-96 Choice Program."9 Therefore, because fewer
than 2,000 students attend nonsectarian private schools in toto, it stands
to reason that the vast majority of the children who would be attending
private schools through the new Choice Program would be attending
religious schools. This fact, along with the fact that the financial assis-
tance is paid on a per-pupil basis, suggests that most of the funds and
the students would be going to religious schools. Therefore, in terms of
the recipients of the aid and the amount of money awarded, the Choice
Program would "primarily" assist students attending religious schools.
Whether the "primary effect" of the funds is to advance religion, how-
ever, is not evident from this purely empirical approach.
Besides an empirical analysis, it may also be helpful to determine
precisely how the state funds would be spent. Under the amended
Choice Program, the State does not indicate how the funds should be
spent. In Nyquist, the Court determined that without any restriction on
the use of the funds, "it simply cannot be denied that [the aid] has a
primary effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the
religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary schools."'9'
According to Nyquist, because the Choice Program funds have no re-
striction, the primary effect of the program would be to advance relig-
ion. Thus, due to the similarity between the choice program and the
funding scheme in Nyquist, the Choice Program would likely fail under
the primary effect prong.
The Lemon test's last consideration is whether there is an excessive
entanglement between church and state. In assessing the existence of
an entanglement, attention should be drawn to "the character and pur-
poses of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government
and religious authority."' 92 In particular, excessive entanglement will
188. See Jackson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip op. at 7.
189. See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Preliminary Injunction, Jackson v. Benson, No.
95-CV-1982 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, Branch 17, January 15, 1997).
190. See Jackson, No. 95-CV-1982, slip op. at 7.
191. 413 U.S. 756,774 (1973).
192. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,615 (1971).
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focus on the presence of (1) "pervasive monitoring by public authori-
ties"; (2) "administrative cooperation" between parochial schools and
the state superintendent of education; and (3) an increased likelihood
that the program will cause "political divisiveness.""
In the case of the Choice Program, the state superintendent oversees
a school's random selection of participating students,'94 pays the parent
or guardian of the selected student a determined amount, 95 monitors
the participating students' performance,196 and conducts financial audits
of program.' 97 Although the statue superintendent is involved in several
vital aspects of the Choice Program, the superintendent's monitoring
does not, on its face, appear to be pervasive. Second, administrative
cooperation between the schools and the state exists but is not excessive
under section 119.23 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Finally, unlike in
Lemon, the facts of the Choice Program do not indicate that the pro-
gram will result in political divisiveness from a continuing demand for
appropriations.9"
Having employed the Lemon test under the Court's traditional ap-
proach, the Choice Program will likely fail under the primary effects in-
quiry. Just as the funding scheme in Nyquist was determined to be con-
stitutionally impermissible under the traditional approach, so too would
the Choice Program.
V. THE CHOICE PROGRAM UNDER THE MODERN SCHEME
Although the traditional test under Lemon would likely invalidate
the Choice Program, the Supreme Court, under its current line of in-
quiry for cases involving aid to religious institutions, allows room for a
school choice program like the Choice Program'
A. Neutrality
One of the primary factors the Court has considered from Everson
to Agostini is the extent to which the statute is neutral or general in
scope. In Mueller, state assistance was neutral because it was allocated
193. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985) (overruled on other grounds by
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)).
194. See Wis. STAT. § 119.23(3)(a) (1995-96).
195. Id. § 119.23(4).
196. Id. § 119.23(7)(b).
197. Id. § 119.23(9).
198. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
199. See Price, supra note 12, at 485-89.
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to a "broad spectrum of citizens."' The Mueller Court recognized the
Minnesota tax deduction program was available to "all parents" of pub-
lic and non-public school students. 20' Due to this neutrality, the pro-
gram was upheld despite the fact that the majority of the tax benefits
went to parents of parochial school children.
Similarly, under the Choice Program, the terms of the assistance ap-
pear to be neutral because the aid is directed at "any pupil" who may
attend "any private school."' Although the funds assist only those
parents whose children are randomly selected to attend a private
school, the program itself is initially available to parents of students
who have been "enrolled in [a public] school district," "attending a pri-
vate school," or "not enrolled in school." '
B. Genuinely Independent and Private Choices
In Mueller and Witters, the Court upheld government aid flowing to
religious institutions that resulted from "genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients." In Mueller, for instance, the parents
of private and public school students were permitted to take tax deduc-
tions for certain school expenses.o Likewise, any assistance received
under the Choice Program requires independent actions and private
choices of the parents of eligible children. The parents are instructed to
submit an application for admission. In addition, once funds are dis-
bursed to the parents, they must endorse the check for use by the
school.m It would appear, therefore, that the Choice Program's scheme
allows for private, independent choices.
C. Financial Incentive
In Witters, the Court held that state funding provided "no financial
incentive for students to undertake sectarian education" because the
money offered no greater benefits for recipients who attended religious
schools.2 Similarly, the government-funded sign-language interpreters
in Zobrest offered no financial incentive because it was a "neutral serv-
200. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388.,398-99 (1983).
201. lId at 390-91.
202. WiS. STAT. § 119.23 (2)(a) (1995-96).
203. Id § 119.23 (2)(a)(2).
204. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S.
481,488 (1986).
205. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391.
206. WIs. STAT. §§ 119.23(3)(a), (4).
207. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
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ice" that did not distinguish between sectarian and non-sectarian
schools.2
Under the Choice Program, the tuition for participating students is
paid for through funds from the state.2 The service provided by the
participating private school, however, is the same service the public
school would have otherwise furnished. If a student chooses to stay in a
public school, the state will distribute that student's share to the public
school. If, however, the student enrolls in a private school under the
Choice Program, the student's share is disbursed to that participating
private school. In either case, neither the parents nor the students re-
ceive a financial benefit from the program.
D. Agostini v. Felton
Under the most recent Establishment Clause scheme from Agostini,
the Supreme Court has allowed more flexibility in its analysis of permis-
sible state aid to schools. First, the Court held that government aid that
provides direct assistance to the educational function of a sectarian
school is permissible.2 '0 This proposition undermines the conclusion
from Nyquist that unrestricted funds have a primary effect of advancing
religion because they directly subsidize the religious activities of the
sectarian schools. 1 Even though the "education function" of many sec-
tarian schools includes the inculcation of religious teachings, Agostini
would permit such assistance. Following this line of reasoning, the
Choice Program would be permissible even if the funds utilized for the
"education function" of the participating sectarian school applied
wholly or in part to foster religious education.
The second proposition from Agostini provides that aid that merely
supplements a school is acceptable as long as it does not relieve the
school of costs it otherwise would have borne in educating its students.
Under the School Choice program, the aid disbursed to the participat-
ing schools is used to cover the tuition of the School Choice children. In
addition, "[n]o more than 49% of a private school's enrollment may
consist of pupils attending the private school under [the Choice Pro-
gram]. 212 Because the aid will never exceed 50% of the tuition re-
ceived, the funding would, arguably, not be regarded as supplanting, but
208. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996).
209. See generally Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1995-96).
210. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2011 (1997).
211. See Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 756,774 (1973).
212. WIS. STAT. § 119.25(2)(b)(2) (1995-96).
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merely supplementing, a school's budget. Moreover, the funding would
not relieve the school of costs it otherwise would have borne in educat-
ing its students. Rather, the funds would be used to cover costs of new
students entering under the Choice Program.
The third proposition under Agostini states that funds not distrib-
uted directly to participating schools are more likely to be valid. This
tenet is met by the Choice Program because the funds, although sent to
the participating schools, are disbursed to the parents who endorse the
checks for the schools.2 3
Finally, Agostini establishes that the proportion of sectarian stu-
dents who receive aid does not determine the program's constitutional-
ity. This proposition, supported by the Court in Mueller,214 would ren-
der inapposite any empirical evidence showing that the students who
benefited from the Choice Program were primarily enrolled in private,
religious schools.
Based on the precedent established by Agostini, it is apparent that
the Choice Program now has as strong a case as ever under the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor, how-
ever, admonished other courts from finding an implicit reversal of
precedent established in other school aid cases.215 It is only a matter of
time, therefore, before the Court takes a school choice case, such as
Wisconsin's, and determines the fate of voucher programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the Supreme Court's traditional approach for determining
the constitutionality of state aid to private schools, the Lemon test
would likely hold Wisconsin's Choice Program unconstitutional because
of the program's resemblance to the state assistance that was rejected in
Nyquist. Recently, however, the Court has adopted new tenets upon
which it will consider such grant programs. In Agostini v. Felton the
Court overruled its prior holdings in Aguilar v. Felton and School Dis-
trict of Grand Rapids v. Ball, and abandoned many of the assumptions
upon which an Establishment Clause analysis has traditionally relied.
Although the Court insisted that Agostini should not be read as a rever-
213. See WIS. STAT. § 119.23(4) (1995-96).
214. The Court in Mueller disregarded the fact that the vast majority of parents bene-
fiting from the tax deductions were parents of private school students. See Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388,401 (1983).
215. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017.
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sal of other school aid cases,1 6 it appears the Court is on the road to
overturning the tenets of Nyquist and opening the door to school choice
in the United States.
PETER M. KIMBALL
216. See id.
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